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Zimbabwe’s land ownership was defined by racially-based inequalities
The evolution of Zimbabwe’s land acquisition
Sam Moyo
The land reform programme in Zimbabwe has raised a number of critical po­
litical economy questions. The massive transfer of land within a short period of 
time and without international financial support calls for a rethinking of our 
understanding of the process of land reform in Africa (Berry, 1993; Platteau, 
1996; Moyo, 2000). Across the African continent, competition over land inten­
sified in the late twentieth century, leading to rising land values, increasingly 
commercialized patterns of land acquisition, concentration of landholdings, 
prolonged litigation, and sometimes to assault and even murder. Evidence of 
growing land pressure and increasing conflict has prompted some observers to 
argue that land reform, once considered a low priority on a continent with plenty 
of land to go around, is now a matter of urgency. Rather than debate the case 
for or against land reform per se, this chapter explores the trends in land acqui­
sition in Zimbabwe in the context of broader debates over economic and politi­
cal transformations.
The purpose of this chapter is to walk the reader through the land acquisi­
tion process throughout the 25 years of Zimbabwe’s independence. The chap­
ter focuses on land acquisition which has been an area of contest throughout 
the independence period. The chapter should be read concurrently with chap­
ters by Matondi and Munyuki-Hungwe (chapter 3) and Makadho (chapter 7) to 
get a clear picture of the linkages of land acquisition, redistribution and na­
tional land policy.
This chapter seeks to accomplish five things. Firstly it discusses the land 
acquisition issue within Zimbabwe’s political economy. In this context the sec­
tion briefly revisits Zimbabwe’s experiences with using market-assisted ap­
proaches in land reform. At the same time, it examines the complexity of at­
tempting compulsory land acquisition in the context of market liberalization of 
the economy. Secondly, it elaborates on the key structure of land demand, in a 
context in which land occupations represented a major focus in sustaining and 
signifying land hunger in Zimbabwe. Thirdly, it analyzes the trends and legal 
aspects of the fast track land acquisition experiences. Fourthly, it elaborates on 
the framework for land reform negotiations internally, bilaterally with the Brit­
ish government, and its international and regional dimension. Finally, land re-
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T able 6.1 T he land acq u isition  process
• Rehabilitation and state formation context
• Market land purchases (mainly marginal lands)
• British co-financing with Government of Zimbabwe matching grants
• High intensity land occupations
• ‘Accelerated redistribution programme’
‘l& jse 2 1987-1996: Policy is * # *  and reduced acquisition
• Economic liberalization
• Black capitalist farmers with minimal state support
• Compulsory acquisition legislated
• Failed renegotiation of British support in land reform
• Low intensity, scattered and low profile occupations
• Economic decline and crisis context
• High intensity, high profile land occupations
• Compulsory land acquisition on a mass scale attempted
• Land reform models negotiations (state versus market assisted)
• Revised law and policy for compulsory acquisition
• Political succession conflicts and land occupations
• Economic decline and crisis context
• Massive land occupations
• Compulsory land acquisition carried out
• Revised constitutional provisions for land acquisitions
• Mass resettlement of people with government acquiring occupied and 
unoccupied land
• Renewed agricultural support
Source: Updated from Moyo (2001)
form negotiations are examined on the assumption that they offer the best chance 
of minimizing conflicts and reviving agricultural production activities.
Land reform in historical context
-v.The protracted liberation struggle that led to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 
was rooted in redressing colonial land expropriation and broader societal injus­
tices. In spite of that struggle, the structural roots of Zimbabwe’s political con­
flict and economic crisis remained largely defined by racially-based inequali­
ties in land ownership (Jacobs, 1984; Gaidzanwa, 1988; Herbst, 1990; Moyo,
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2000a).88 The Lancaster House agreement in 1979 generally provided for a po­
litical compromise and merely tinkered with respect to land reform and eco­
nomic development of the majority blacks. Land resettlement was thus part of 
government policy to address the unequal access to land with the hope of cre­
ating political stability and economic development (Kinsey, 1982;Tshuma, 1997; 
Moyana, 1984; Government of Zimbabwe, 1998). However, power relations in 
Zimbabwe as in most of the former settler colonies (Moyo, 2000c) were intrin­
sically based upon inequitable (economic) structures developed over a century, 
mainly through minority white rule and control over land.
Zimbabwe’s land reform history is complex but it can be conceptualized in 
terms of an erratically phased process of differential implementation of land 
acquisition for redistribution, defined by changing policy objectives, approaches, 
financing and impacts (table 6.1). Such a periodization based on significant 
variations in the quantities of land acquired and redistributed over time was 
largely influenced by the changing political and economic contexts.
v The first phase commenced in the early 1980s when government acquired 
o?er 65 per cent of the 3.6 million hectares transferred to poor families by 
1997. Most of these land transfers took place in a context of land occupations 
by peasants, especially from 1980 to 1985, and mostly in the Eastern High­
lands (Tshuma, 1997; Moyana, 1984). These occupations were regularized into 
official allocation through the accelerated land resettlement programme. The 
budget allocations of the government and the £37 million provided by the United 
Kingdom government were used for both land acquisition and settler emplace­
ment (Utete, 2003). The phase ended in 1987 with a policy review that ush­
ered in a cautious economic structural adjustment programme which led to 
reduced land acquisition and resettlement. In 1996 there was failure to reach 
agreement on extending British support to land reform following the election 
of the Labour party.
The second phase was characterized by limited land acquisition and redis­
tribution. The policy thrust of promoting small and large-scale black commer-
In a country where the agriculture sector dominates the economy, access to land and re­
lated resources has implications for economic control and power relations. The majority 
blacks residing in communal lands largely remained inferior in terms of lifestyles and 
wealth compared to whites who had access to better quality land, controlled the non-farm 
g9 sectors (finance, manufacturing, services), had better education, and so on.
The United Kingdom government committed £40 million but due to stringent conditions 
based on the disbursement of counterpart funds to match Zimbabwean funds, at least £3 
million remained unspent by the time the negotiations broke down. The Government of 
Zimbabwe at times failed to match the British financial inputs, especially when fiscal 
deficits expanded from the late 1980s onwards.
This included the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, Zimbabwe: a framework fo r  economic 
reform 1991-1995, Second five-year national development plan, 1991-1995, and the re­
port of the Commission of Inquiry into appropriate land tenure systems.
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cial fanners was pronounced, albeit without allocating much land or finance to 
this sector. The promotion of black agrarian capitalists was announced but 
government support was not provided to start such farming. Eventually more 
of the poorer small-scale black farmers benefited from the redistribution, while 
400 large-scale black farmers accessed 400,000 hectares of state leasehold land. 
This amounted to about 10 per cent of all land transferred to blacks. Laws to 
enhance compulsory land acquisition were developed in 1991 and tested with­
out success throughout this period, while British and donor finance were mini­
mal.
The third period started partially in 1997 with the designation of 1,471 
large farms for possible compulsory acquisition. Most of the farms (804) were 
delisted as the government, donors and large-scale farmers sought a negotiated 
framework. This led to the donors’ conference in September of 1998 and the 
‘inception phase framework plan’. During this period less than 250,000 hec­
tares of land were acquired by government (table 6.2). In 1998, there were 
spontaneous land occupations in most parts of the country that were subse­
quently suppressed by the government before the end of the year, in the spirit 
of negotiations. However, the state also changed its policy tide as it veered 
towards constitutional issues. The expectation was that the land question would 
be addressed through constitutional provisions. However, following the rejec­
tion of the draft constitution in 2000 in a referendum, war veterans and other 
ZANU-PF supporters moved on to white-owned farms.
Table 6.2 Periodization of land acquisition
ffc rtp *
1980-1984 
(5 years)
Ib ta l  . 
acquired'"
2,147,855
. A w a g e
per year
429,571
No.
households
settled
30,000
*
Constitutional constraints
1985-1990 
(6 years)
447,791 74,632 20,000 Land Acquisition Act, 1985
1992-1997 
(5 years: 1996 
omitted)
789,645 157,929 20,000 Land Acquisition Act, 1992
1998-2000 
(3  years)
228,839 76,279 1,000 Land reform negotiations
2000-2004 
(4 years)
12,387,571 135,000 Compulsory land 
acquisition under fast track
Total 23 years 16,001,701 190,217 201,000
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The fourth period elaborately discussed below saw the Government of Zim­
babwe increasingly pursuing land reform with minimal reference to donor or 
commercial farmer collaboration from 2000. This was based on government 
misgivings that these could offer money or land on reasonable terms for a rapid 
distribution programme. This ‘go it alone’ period demanded by radicals in 
ZANU-PF was based on massive compulsory land acquisition efforts circum­
scribed by escalating land occupations. These forceful approaches were, how­
ever, intermittently laced with high profile negotiation and dialogue between 
the Government of Zimbabwe, the Commercial Farmers' Union and donors. 
Nonetheless, although by August 2000 over 3,000 farms had been targeted for 
compulsory acquisition, less than 30 farms amounting to less than 60,000 hec­
tares had been acquired through compulsory methods. Over 95 per cent of all 
redistributed land was acquired through markets and, of this, over 60 per cent 
of the land acquisition costs were paid for by the government. This period saw 
even greater fiscal deficits and a growing economic crisis which was accompa­
nied by increasingly aggressive demands for land redistribution.
"V" The dominant land acquisition approach between 1980 and 1997 can be 
described as a state-centred market-assisted approach. Land was purchased 
by the state for redistribution following willing-seller/willing-buyer procedures 
that were agreed to in the Lancaster House agreement. The private sector iden­
tified the land available for resettlement while the central government pur­
chased land on offer. The government then provided land to beneficiaries se­
lected mainly by district officials under the supervision of central government 
officials. The Zimbabwe experience with the market approach was that the 
amount, quality* location and price of land acquired for redistribution, was 
driven by landholders. It was neither the government, as driver of the land 
acquisition policy, nor the beneficiaries who controlled the process. Moreover, 
since the state had been a key buyer of land on offer, this in itself conditioned *934
9 ]
The United Nations Development Programme did send several missions such as the one 
led by the senior administrator Malloch Brown to Commonwealth negotiations in Abuja, 
culminating in an agreement that could have released 26 million pounds from Britain for 
g2 land acquisition.
It was state centred in the sense that the state had the right of first refusal of all large-scale 
commercial farms put on the market. The Government of Zimbabwe had introduced a 
‘certificate of no present interest’ through the 1985 Land Acquisition Act. Though the 
willing seller/willing buyer remained the framework for land acquisition the state was
93 central in determining which farms it was interested in for resettlement purposes.
Over 70 per cent of the land acquired for resettlement on the market tended to be agro- 
ecologically marginal and located mainly in four provinces in the south of Zimbabwe.
94 This left much of the prime lands of the three Mashonaland provinces untouched. 
Indeed, Government of Zimbabwe officials complained that not only was the quality of 
land transferred poor but the prices were inflationary. Moreover, the fact that farms of­
fered were scattered geographically meant that moving a few settlers to single farms iso­
lated from communal areas was expensive and logistically ineffective.
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the parameters of the land market in terms of land prices and a procurement 
process amenable to the government’s settlement planning system. Whereas 
policy debates, especially on the second phase of land reform, emphasized the 
need for land acquisition to be implemented in a transparent, cost-effective, 
efficient and fair manner, there was less debate on how market land acquisition 
governed and limited the supply of land.
Land demand and land occupations
j j j h e  land question in Zimbabwe was fuelled by the long-standing urban and 
rural95 demands for land within the entire spectrum of land ownership (private, 
state and communal), pitting various classes, ethnicities, citizenry and various 
social categories of the poor against landowners, the state and each other (Moyo, 
2000). The demands for land by black families or households were also differ­
entiated by gender, class, location, use and even citizenship. Demands were 
made in relation to the redress of lost land rights, residential land,96 “the need for 
land to subsist on through agricultural production for own consumption and 
sale of surpluses, and for purely commercial purposes in agriculture, tourism, 
real estate and general business premises.97 The demand was also expressed 
through various leadership levels. Thus local chiefs, headmen, party chiefs, 
members of parliament and other people not only competed with central gov­
ernment politicians and bureaucrats over land control, they also competed 
amongst themselves for the political and economic capital to be gained from 
control over allocating land rights (Moyo, 1995). The demand for land how­
ever was strongly expressed through land occupations.98
95
The Riddell Commission of inquiry into incomes, prices and conditions of service, assess­
ing the land requirements, estimated that at independence there were about 780,000 farm­
ing families in the peasant communal sector. On the basis of conservation and extension 
criteria, communal areas could carry and provide with an adequate income only a total of 
325,000 families. Assuming that 235,000 families were partly dependent upon incomes 
from migrant worker family members, the commission concluded that there remained 
some 219,000 families needing to be resettled.
There were the unrecognized land needs or rights of the urban poor and young profession­
als relegated to homelessness, illegal squatting, crowded lodging and long distance or 
peri-urban commuting by the escalating land and housing market prices in a situation of 
diminished state support for basic home ownership. There was increased agitation for 
urban land rights for housing and peri-urban agriculture.
Whilst the focus on land demand was in the communal areas, a major methodological 
problem was that many of the people in the communal areas had moved to urban centres 
where there was an even weaker social security system and sources of economic repro­
duction. Thus if we combine the land short and landless in both communal areas and 
urban areas, a significant population of blacks was landless in the first 20 years of inde­
pendence.
Land occupation in the Zimbabwean debate can be conceptualized in three broad types. 
These are: the Government of Zimbabwe conceptualization of these as political demon-
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The incidence of land occupations in Zimbabwe was presented in the do­
mestic and international media as new, yet illegal occupations in the 1980s 
affected commercial farms, communal lands, national parks, urban areas and 
state land, often through violent means. These land occupations coincided in 
intensity with the period when most of the land was acquired using the willing- 
seller/willing-buyer instrument. The state formalized land occupations in what 
they called then an ‘accelerated land reform programme’ as opposed to a nor­
mal intensive land reform (Herbst, 1990; Moyo, 1998; Alexander, 1994; Hughes, 
1998; Matondi, 2001; Kinsey, 1983; Moyo, 1995; Hughes, 1998; Moyo, 1987). 
Communities became central in land identification, as they identified those 
farms they deemed underused through ‘squatting’ and central government then 
came in to purchase such land. Subsequently, the Government of Zimbabwe 
used forced evictions to restrain this approach but used them as a major impe­
tus in negotiating for resources to finance market processes of land acquisition. 
In general the control of illegal land occupations was circumscribed by gov­
ernment through a ‘squatter policy’, regular promises of land redistribution as 
well as through other forms of agricultural support schemes intended to im­
prove the intensity of communal area land-use in situ and returns.
During the 1990s, landless communities increased illegal occupations of 
land and poaching of natural resources in private, state and communally owned 
lands, and in urban areas (Moyo, 1998). By the end of 1997, isolated land 
occupations started to occur, with the explicit aim of redistributing land from 
white farmers to landless villagers and war veterans. The occupations came in 
waves, starting with just a few in 1997 (Moyo, 1998; Moyo, 2001) and reach­
ing just under a thousand by 2000. In some instances, the farm occupations 
were peaceful and farm work was allowed to continue; in other instances, white 
farmers and farmworkers were driven off the land. The Zimbabwe police took 
no action to prevent the farm occupations, claiming that they lacked the capa­
bility to repel the squatters or that these conflicts had to be resolved at the *
strations in which land is not literally seized but transgressed to make a statement. The next 
type is defined by the Commercial Farmer’s Union as illegal occupations or aggressive 
seizure. The third type is the invasions, which include occupations and short visits. The 
fourth type is squatting which includes opportunists who are occupiers not recognized by 
war veterans or those regarded as criminal elements.
The government formally opposed land invasions or private occupations (Alexander, 1994), 
and encouraged -  through the law, court actions and the police, in collaboration with 
large-scale commercial farmers and local authorities -  the regular eviction of squatters, at 
times through violent removals (for example, torching of squatter houses, destruction of 
i00personal effects, dumping the squatters at places without facilities).
The land occupations were characterized by revolutionary songs and occasionally threat­
ening gestures but did not physically abuse farmers or farmworkers or damage property. 
On some occasions, violence that included physical damage to people, property and live­
stock occurred. The state then used the army and the land committees to control such 
damage.
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political level. Court orders requiring the squatters to leave were ignored. Gov­
ernment of Zimbabwe was, however, under strong international pressure to 
exercise restraint with land designations. Donors and international financial 
institutions warned that the proposed takeover programme would inflict severe 
economic damage by deterring investors and cutting exports. The International 
Monetary Fund delayed a balance of payments support disbursement primarily 
because of concerns over government’s land policy and its effect on invest­
ment. The land occupations changed the rural agrarian landscape and relations 
as for the first time large-scale white farmers had to co-exist with numerous 
black farmers.
In summary the government’s policy on controlling occupation was mired 
in legal and political complexity that has shaped Zimbabwe’s land question 
and the nature of its land reform programme since 1980. Poaching, encroach­
ing, squatting and trespassing largely became the available means of express­
ing land demand and through them a war of attrition was waged against the 
prevailing property regime. Yet it is critical to understand that land occupations 
were a colonial creation and phenomenon and remained part and parcel of Zim­
babwe’s histor^jThe policy’s legal basis was to affirm the particular land rights 
of land owners against the land claims and land grabbing of the landless and 
homeless who bid for land rights, and the long-standing victims of direct land 
expropriation who sought restitution. It is this control of land occupations and 
change of heart in 2000 which questioned the whole motive of the state in 
condoning the land occupations on large commercial farms. While squatting 
could have been occasioned by the political instigation of a few ruling party 
members or by the failed, delayed or unrealistic promises of land, there is no 
doubt that the homeless and landless unemployed had a right to some mini­
mum quantum of land. The social forces, organizational precedence and legacy 
underlying occupations were a key barometer for understanding the shortfall 
of the land reform programme. When war veterans demanded a resolution of 
the land question, a radical leadership was bom to take advantage of disgrun­
tled rural communities who felt the government had under-delivered on its 
promises of land reform.
Fast track compulsory land acquisition
Trends in fast track land reforms
In view of the land occupations, initially led by the war veterans and later 
including a broad section of Zimbabwean society, the government took a policy 
stance to embark on a speedier land reform programme in 2000. The land occu- 10
101 In the large-scale commercial farms, small-scale commercial farms, official occupiers in 
communal and resettlement areas, as well as state agencies in parks, forests and state 
farms or leasehold lands.
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pations and a number of other events and issues influenced the adoption of fast 
track land reform:
• The collapse of the 1996 negotiations with the British government over 
finances for land acquisition;
• Ambivalent donors responses to the inception phase framework plan and 
lack of mobilizing resources at the 1998 donors’ conference;
• The continued legal challenges by white commercial farmers, especially 
with respect to the 804 farms of the 1,471 farms identified in 1997 that had 
been delisted;
• The rejection of the 2000 draft constitution which could have facilitated 
speedier government land acquisition.
The fast track land reform programme was designed to be undertaken in an 
accelerated manner and with reliance on domestic resources. According to Utete 
(2003) the programme was a turning point in government land policy in terms 
of philosophy, practices and procedures of acquiring land and resettling peo­
ple. The key elements of the fast track were:
• To speed up the identification for compulsory acquisition of not less than 5 
million hectares of land for resettlement;
• To accelerate the planning and demarcation of acquired land and settler 
emplacement on this land;
• To provide limited basic infrastructure (such as boreholes, dip tanks and 
access roads) and farmer support services (such as tillage and agricultural 
inputs).
In the midst of the fast track reform in 2001, the government land acquisition 
policy targets were revised from the original target of 5 million hectares
Table 6.3 Farm s gazetted  under the fast track  program m e
Province Number of farms Area (ha) % ofland
Mashonaland West 1,489 1,814,270 14.65
Mashonaland East 1,316 1,402,116 11.32
Mashonaland Central 876 976,655 7.88
Manicaland 755 682,257 5.51
Midlands 699 1,350,483 10.9
Matabeleland North 638 2,043,764 16.5
Matabeleland South 492 2,129,171 17.19
Masvingo 444 1,992,158 16.08
Total 6,712 12,387,571 100
Source: ZANU PF Conference, Central Committee Report, 2003
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(Makadho, chapter 7) to 11 million hectares. This implied that government 
intended to acquire all large-scale commercial farms or that government land 
tenure policy had veered towards converting acquired agricultural freehold land 
to leasehold land.102 The Utete (2003) committee estimated 6,422 farms cover­
ing 10,839,108 hectares being acquired by government by October 2003. How­
ever, by 3 November 2003, 6,712 farms covering an area of 12,387,571 hec­
tares nationwide had been gazetted (see table 6.3).103 The differences between 
the findings of the Utete (2003) committee and the government report deserve 
some explanation.
Government officials attribute the variance to time differences between the 
two assessments (African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2003). Government 
worked on the basis that there were 8,758 farm properties in existence prior to 
the fast track land reform programme while the Utete (2003) committee identi­
fied 9,135 properties. The fact that the gazetted figures in area exceeded 12 
million hectares created further confusion given that all large-scale farms did 
not exceed 11.6 million hectares. It seems that the number of white-owned 
farms that were not appropriated was not clearly known. The Utete (2003) 
report found that 1,332 farmers were still farming on 1,377 farms covering 
1,175,607 hectares by 31 July 2003. On the contrary the Commercial Farmers’ 
Union estimated that only 485 of their members were left with their farms. 
This created the impression there may have been some double counting of 
farms.
At the core of the slow pace in concluding the land acquisition process 
were the disagreements on valuation of farm improvements and lack of re­
sources on the part of government to offer compensation. The Commercial 
Farmers’ Union and Justice for Agriculture contended that the amounts offered 
by government were below the true value of the farms. By December 2003, 
only 3,310 farms, or less than half, had been inspected for valuation and com­
pensation purposes. Conflicting figures were reported on the number of farm-
102 The gazetting and re-gazetting of farms, including farms protected under investment agree­
ments beyond 2003, reflected also in the policy to move acquisition targets upwards, to 
shift the entire land tenure regime and to increase the bargaining position of the Govern­
ment of Zimbabwe in its negotiations over former large-scale commercial farm land- 
|raowner retentions and delistings (African Institute for Agrarian Studies, 2003).
The majority of the farms were acquired in the three Mashonaland provinces which con­
tributed 55 per cent of the farms but only 34 per cent of the acreage. In acreage terms the 
relatively drier Matabeleland and Masvingo provinces provided the most land, contribut­
i n g  49.8 per cent to the total gazetted area.
The residual differences arose from weakness in the land acquisition data management 
system, especially in the entry statistical analyses, exacerbated by the frequent changes 
occasioned by the need to gazette most farms which were successfully contested in courts 
|ojor those whose time-bound notices and orders expired before hearings.
This was in the context of a high inflationary environment which reached a peak of 622 
per cent by the end of 2003.
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ers who were compensated. The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Re­
settlement reported that about 300 out of the more than 4,500 farmers who 
were displaced by the land reform programme had claimed compensation (Fi­
nancial Gazette, 12 December 2003). However, a report presented at the ZANU- 
PF conference in early December 2003 claimed that only 156 displaced com­
mercial farmers had received compensation.
The government set aside a total of Z$8 billion for farm improvement com­
pensation, Z$4.5 billion of which was pledged in the 2003/04 budget (ZANU- 
PF Annual conference, 2003). Whereas government estimated the Z$4.5 bil­
lion could have compensated 500 farms, the Commercial Farmers’ Union esti­
mated that the Z$8 billion at over 500 per cent inflation-influenced prices could 
only compensate 30 farms. This represented a huge gap in perceptions between 
the two sides creating further polarization. The negotiation processes were not 
helped by threats issued by the agriculture minister that the government could 
disburse the money accumulated for compensation to resettled black farmers if 
displaced farmers continued to refuse to accept government assessed compen­
sation (Financial Gazette, 12 December 2003). The wide gap between what 
government offered and what farmers claimed was the true value of their im­
provements (an 800 per cent difference) indicated that settlement was going to 
be difficult to reach.
Legal issues in the fast track land reform programme
The empirical patterns of compulsory land acquisition reflect the official ap­
proach that had been evolving over the last 20 years through the gradual enact­
ment of suitable legislation (Moyo, 1998). The Government of Zimbabwe re­
garded the Lancaster House constitution as a major hindrance to the resolution 
of the land question and in particular as a major constraint on the government’s 
land reform and redistribution programme. Accordingly, after the entrenched 
provisions of the Lancaster House constitution expired in 1990, government 
amended the constitution to remove those aspects which it viewed as a major 
hindrance to effective acquisition of land for redistribution. In this regard the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 11) Act 30 of 1990 and the Con­
stitution of Zimbabwe (No. 12) Act 4 of 1993 were enacted. These were fol­
lowed by a new land acquisition framework embodying the new constitutional 
principles in the form of the Land Acquisition Act, of 1992 (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 1992). These constitutional amendments became a basis for the 
Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20:10). These were highly contested both in the 
political and legal arenas as they were viewed by many, but in particular by the 
predominantly white commercial farming sector, as constituting a serious threat, 
not just to the security of tenure and to agricultural investment, but also to the 
viability of commercial agriculture in the country.
Before 1990, the compensation provision obliged the acquiring authority
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to ‘pay promptly adequate compensation’ for land acquisition and such com­
pensation was required to be paid in foreign currency in any country of the 
owner’s choice, whenever the owner so elected. It was this part of the Lancas­
ter House constitution which received the most severe criticism and was seen 
as the major hindrance to land acquisition and redistribution. Not only did it 
mean that relatively high prices had to be paid for the land acquired but also 
such payments had to be made in scarce foreign currency. In 1990 the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution eliminated the requirement to pay compensa­
tion in foreign currency and the concomitant right of remittance thereof in the 
hope that land for resettlement would thereafter become much more affordable 
to the state.
The requirement to pay compensation was also modified from the payment 
of prompt, adequate compensation to payment of ‘fair compensation within a 
reasonable time’ from the time of acquisition. The new laws also sought to 
deny the courts power to declare unconstitutional any law which may be seen 
as fixing or providing for compensation which was not fair. However, the courts 
still retained jurisdiction to determine the level of compensation where there 
was no agreement between the parties. But the attempt to oust the jurisdiction 
of the courts in the invalidation of unfair compensation laws was severely criti­
cized and was the main cause of the country’s bad image over the protection of 
landed property rights. All in all, the land acquisition framework established 
by the constitution was not merely fairly rigorous and tight but clearly en­
trenched the judicial method of expropriation as against the administrative 
method under which expropriation was carried out through purely administra­
tive acts without judicial control or supervision (Government of Zimbabwe, 
2001) .
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution in 2000 (Government of Zim­
babwe, 2000a) absolved the Government of Zimbabwe from compensating for 
land if a fund was created in which the former colonial power could deposit 
requisite monies to compensate for the soil. The government was only obliged 
to pay for improvements and even on this it could deduct from the sale price 
the previous government subsidies which accrued to landowners. The amend­
ment also stipulated a variety of factors which could be considered in estimat­
ing the compensation value for improvements (for example, amounts paid to 
previous landowners by the current landholder, the value of investments, and 
so on).
Following the above constitutional changes, the Land Acquisition Act (Gov­
ernment of Zimbabwe , 2000b) was amended in 2000. This was done to free 
the government from any obligation to pay for unimproved land and to define 
the process and valuation of compensation for improvements. Secondly, the 
Land Acquisition Act (Government of Zimbabwe, 2000b) streamlined the pre­
vious Act’s dual route of compulsory acquisition by eliminating the designa-
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tion route (which slowed the land acquisition process) and by retaining the 
direct acquisition route but with more clearly defined procedures for compen­
sation. Thirdly, the Land Acquisition Act Amendment (Government of Zimba­
bwe, 2000b) removed numerous administrative and/or legal procedural encum­
brances and time-consuming processes which led to the mostly successful liti­
gations against compulsory acquisition between 1993 and 1999.
Land reform negotiations
Land reform negotiations between government, landowners and donors have 
been attempted since independence. Land reform negotiations could be an ac­
ceptable route for land reform -  where parties are prepared to compromise 
their privileges and positions for less conflict-ridden land reform to be a suc­
cess. Whilst in the past large-scale farmers buttressed by donors and the private 
sector remained steadfast in their ‘resistance to compromise’ of their privi­
leges, the government and the ruling party also adopted the ‘resistance to com­
promise’ stance during the fast track period. In most of the 1980s until the 
middle 1990s, the government negotiated from a weak vantage given that it 
had no resources, no land and received minimal support from donors. There 
were overtures from government to landowners to reach an internal compro­
mise on many of the contentious land reform issues. Government and various 
representative organizations (including war veterans, farmers, academics and 
farming unions) all pushed for dialogue rather than confrontation. Yet in an 
effort to reach a win-win situation, some interest groups such as war veterans 
used force through land occupations (and liberation war credentials) to arm 
twist both government and large-scale farmers to speed up the land reform 
process.
Most dialogue initiatives of white landowners led by the Commercial Farm­
ers’ Union in the 1990s predominantly focused on defending the economic 
values of land to the nation. They tended to ignore the political implications of 
resisting land reform in a context of growing inequalities. The lack of partner­
ships with adjacent peasant communities, poor treatment of trespassers, viola­
tion of farmworker rights and unfair produce and labour extraction from peas­
ant communities through unfair contract farming arrangements further alien­
ated the large-scale farmers. There were a few localized cases of successful co­
existence between landowners and local peasants but these were only based on 
labour-inputs relations and tillage provisions and did not involve the sharing or 
ceding of land to those landless communities. Whereas many blacks as histori­
cal victims of land expropriation were prepared, under normal circumstances
106The land restitution approach to land transfer, which would have to be guided by the 
formal review of substantiated land claims to be restored to specific claimants, was re­
jected by the Government of Zimbabwe on grounds of its being too legalistic, bureau­
cratically cumbersome and slow.
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of non-confrontation or polarization, to negotiate land redistribution as a de­
velopment and poverty reduction issue, their instinctive demand was for politi­
cal redress through unconditional return of land rights.
At times the government’s posture appeared not to provide room for nego­
tiation when in fact negotiations and trade-offs with stakeholders were part of 
the earlier resettlement programme. The fact that such negotiations were not 
widely publicized alienated the less-informed international community and 
important segments of the Zimbabwean public. The efforts of the landowners 
to offer land were testimony that there was some level of dialogue which needed 
to be strengthened by both domestic and international forces. The highly charged 
political environment that obtained from 2000 and the unreliable information 
such as the extent of occupations, production patterns and issues of rule of law 
used by all stakeholders to buttress their subjective positions, created conflicts 
rather than consensus. Thus the credibility of land reform was affected by the 
absence of a transparent plan and policy dialogue process which was necessary 
to counteract attempts to sensationalize the perceived relative costs and ben­
efits of land reform. For instance, land reform negotiations could have been 
based on:
• The land offers by large-scale commercial farmers in 1997 of 1.5 million 
hectares;
• The financial pledges made at the 1998 donor’s conference;
• The 118 farms offered by large-scale commercial fanners within the con­
text of the inception phase framework plan in 1999;
• The Zimbabwe joint resettlement initiative with provisions for 1 million 
hectares and financial support that could have been mobilized by commer­
cial farmers in 2001; and
• The Abuja agreement where the British government promised 26 million 
pounds for land reform in 2001.
In fact, had all parties committed to firm agreements, progress on negotiations 
could have been achieved. The Zimbabwe joint resettlement initiative, which 
offered 20 per cent (1 million hectares) of the government’s initial target of 5 
million hectares, was the first attempt by landowners to cooperate with govern­
ment in a major land redistribution effort. This initiative addressed govern­
ment’s needs and concurrently provided a basis for the mobilization of sub­
stantial international resources for land compensation as well as resettlement. 
This approach could have succeeded if it had represented one step in a process 
of commitment to transfer the targeted 5 million hectares of land. However, 
this approach to dialogue led by land offers could have succeeded if it was 
backed by guarantees for compensation to landowners. The offers were how­
ever not backed by adequate political commitment at the international level as 
was expected by all parties in Zimbabwe.
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Key stakeholders in the land reform programme left it until too late to 
negotiate on the programme to avert violent conflicts that became 
instrumentalized after 2000. In fact, by resorting to the use of courts to redress 
the problem, this further alienated and hardened the positions of all the stake­
holders (farmers, government and war veterans). The emergence of the Move­
ment for Democratic Change (MDC) and its alleged links with the white com­
mercial farmers and the British government further created problems. It be­
came the basis upon which ZANU-PF mobilized its propaganda strategies. 
The benefits of the land transfers and the untenable situation that existed due to 
the political party confrontation inadvertently benefited the land reform pro­
gramme with respect to land transfers. However, the negative impact has seen 
the contraction of the economy, disruption of exports, rapid unemployment 
and disruption of food security. A bipartisan negotiating framework would have 
benefited both parties and eliminated the negative impact of the land reform 
programme. Given the high stakes, this has not been possible.
Zimbabwe’s relationship with international donors, including bilateral do­
nor agencies and multilateral donors such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, in financing land reform and land acquisition in particular has 
been negative and often characterized by mutual distrust and suspicion. In the 
late 1980s, the World Bank promoted market-based land reforms (Moyo, 2000b) 
while failing to provide resources for land reforms during the economic struc­
tural adjustment programme period from 1991 to 1995 (Government of Zim­
babwe, 1991). Moreover, the economic structural adjustment programme in­
ternationalized interests in Zimbabwe’s land through land stock-owning and 
shareholder arrangements, introducing yet another source of conflict in the land 
equation (Moyo, 2000a). In general white landowners, non-governmental 
organizations and some political parties entered negotiations towards ‘alterna­
tive’ market-assisted and community-based models of land transfer, as prac-
07 The Movement for Democratic Change in its policy proposal suggested that it would 
acquire 7 million hectares instead of the ZANU-PF target of 5 million hectares. ZANU 
(PF) responded by increasing its target to 9 million hectares and eventually to 12 million 
hectares. Occasionally Movement for Democratic Change was accused of reversing the 
|oggains of land reform and it was said they would give back the land to the whites.
There was the growth of external investors in the agricultural sector, particularly in horti­
culture production, beef ranching, wildlife and eco-tourism. Such investors resisted at­
tempts to compulsorily acquire land by the state, thus internationalizing Zimbabwe’s ques­
t i o n  (see Moyo, 2000a, for an elaborate discussion of these trends).
It brought conflicts in the sense that those large-scale commercial farmers who wanted to 
avoid land designation would go into partnership with investors as Government of Zim­
babwe policy exempted those farms purchased or used by investors for their enterprises. 
The tendency, particularly in the conservancies, was to exclude the neighbouring commu­
nities who became embroiled in poaching wildlife in those conservancies. A second prob­
lem was the conversion of arable land into wildlife ranching, particularly in the Mashona- 
land provinces, which threatened food security (Moyo, 2000a).
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tised in Brazil (Moyo, 2001). Many Zimbabweans feared that alternative ap­
proaches were a ploy aimed at enriching elites who had held on to land 
speculatively as they would demand market prices for their land from the ben­
eficiaries.
At the bilateral level there were various differences over financing land 
acquisitions between the government and the British. The British contended 
that some farms purchased were not entirely voluntarily sold due to land occu­
pations. Later on, the British alleged that the Government of Zimbabwe had 
used some of the land purchased with United Kingdom monies for state farm­
ing (Agricultural and Rural Development Authority estates), and that such land 
was later given to black elite commercial farmers. In turn the government ac­
cused the landowners of not being serious about land reform as most of the 
land purchased under the British monitoring scheme was marginal land offloaded 
at exorbitant prices. This diminished the opportunity cost of government match­
ing funds in the land acquisition and resettlement programme.
Moreover, in 1997 the newly elected British Labour government proposed 
that the new Department for International Development poverty-oriented de­
velopment aid provided the policy framework for assistance to Zimbabwe land 
reform. The Labour government also contended that it did not have historic 
responsibility for Zimbabwe’s land expropriation because the British govern­
ment was not of landowning or settler stock (Utete, 2003). Claire Short (British 
Secretary for Overseas Development) stated:
‘I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special respon­
sibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new gov­
ernment from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. 
My own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonized not colonizers’ 
(Short, in Utete, 2003:15).
This new impasse was followed by a series of diplomatic conflicts that degen­
erated in the period 1997-2000.
When attempts at negotiations were made at the height of the fast track 
programme, the British government rationalized land financing conditions prem­
ised on political issues (such as the need for electoral monitoring, reducing 
electoral violence and enforcing the rule of law on the farms), while key land 
reform principles and issues (resources to compensate for land, policy on black 
commercial farming and the role of land reform in poverty alleviation) were 
sidelined (Dashwood, 2000). The United Kingdom emphasized the need for 
macro-economic stability and governance reforms as a basis for offering money 
for land reform while refusing to acknowledge its failure to act on the inception 
phase immediately after the 1998 donors’ conference in Harare in support of 
the purchase of 118 farms that had been on offer. The British government reit­
erated the need to stick to inception phase principles but failed to acknowledge 
that donors did not play their part.
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Governments in the southern African region initially regarded the problem 
as a United Kingdom-Government of Zimbabwe colonial and post-colonial 
affair. This was before the land occupation crisis spilled over into these coun­
tries. For instance in South Africa, the Landless Peoples’ Movement promoted 
land occupations in some provinces and in the periphery of Johannesburg. In 
Namibia, there were some movements onto farms with government threaten­
ing that they would condone the occupations if the landowners were unwilling 
to release land for resettlement. In Malawi in the southern part of the country, 
the Malawi Congress party and the United Democratic Front promoted land 
occupations. The governments in southern Africa also realized the calamity of 
the Zimbabwe land crisis when faced by the potential menace of economic and 
political refugees spilling over into their own countries. Various initiatives led 
by the Commonwealth and the United Nations Development Programme sought 
to reduce political conflicts but failed because it was too late as Zimbabwe was 
entrapped in conflicts. The government refused to remove land occupiers until 
meaningful resources where made available. The international partners on the 
other hand convoluted the land reform programme with internal political proc­
esses creating a deep-seated crisis in Zimbabwe.
Lessons and prospects in the next decade
In the next decade Zimbabwe has many choices to make with respect to land 
policy. Negotiations should be given a chance to lessen the negative impact of 
the land reform programme on agricultural production. Radicalism in land trans­
fer and management should not be a permanent feature in Zimbabwe’s agrar­
ian system and economy. It damages the country’s international image when 
the success of agricultural performance as recorded in the first and second ag­
ricultural revolutions were based on Zimbabwe’s ability to tap into interna­
tional markets. Therefore Zimbabwe needs to revive its agriculture through 
specific policies that address productivity.
Zimbabwe’s land acquisition experience is not exceptional or unique when 
compared to numerous countries which have undertaken land reforms in the 
last 50 years. That experience shows that land redistribution programmes based 
primarily on market land purchases are universally contested (Moyo, 2001) 
and in fact proscribed or driven by real struggles to control land through organ­
ized social actions at the local level, which in turn lead to state initiatives to 
redistribute land. But the international community -  notably multilateral agen­
cies -  have corollarily diminished their activist role in the last 15 years of land 
reform, leading to unsustainable local land reform and greater conflict from 
land and resource inequities.
Land-related issues that still need attention include the conclusion of land 
acquisition, including settling of some large-scale commercial farmers on ap-
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propriately sized plots, as well as addressing the security of tenure issue spell­
ing out the rights and obligations of settlers. There is need for policy with 
regard to the conditions under which land transfers (besides through inherit­
ance) will be allowed and/or how land markets will be allowed to operate or 
regulated. Land ownership and use conversions (for example to three tier 
schemes, wildlife conservancies and farm size and equity holdings) should be 
sped up through technical support and new forms of tenure assigned with flex­
ibility.
The institutions that emerged within the context of the fast track programme 
were not essentially democratic. They had a job to do within the context of 
radical land transfers. Now that the job is done, there is a need to reorganize the 
institutional framework for land management. The separation of the land ad­
ministration functions from agriculture seems to have created more conflicts 
than solutions. This means there is need to create an independent land institu­
tion that will rationalize and strengthen dispersed land institutions. This will 
allow for better coordination of regular land policy formulation, monitoring 
and implementation, as well as inter-agency (central/local) relations and re­
sponsibilities (land allocation, registration, acquisition). Such a framework will 
give confidence to land users in their efforts to work the land rather than con­
tinue dealing with dissipated institutions fighting for the political control of the 
land reform process.
Then there is the question of the separation of administrative functions 
from adjudicatory (land dispute resolution) powers, at the central government 
administrative level and in the decentralized structures (district administration, 
chiefs, village committees versus local and traditional court independence). 
The independence of the land agency from other developmental functions such 
as the agriculture and local government ministries is an issue that will mini­
mize intra-govemmental conflict of interest and concentration of power, and 
the limitations that this brings to accountability within the government. Decen­
tralization should be sought to improve the participation of land users, vulner­
able groups (women and young men), farmers’ associations and wider local 
stakeholders, in addition to government officials and traditional authorities, in 
decision-making over land matters.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed Zimbabwe’s land acquisition experience since inde­
pendence and has shown how it was guided by market-assisted and compul­
sory instruments. The actual Government of Zimbabwe land acquisition policy 
outcome of the 1990s remained slightly contradictory or hesitant in terms of 
the pace of land acquisition and the level of financial allocations made by the 
government for the implementation of its land acquisition and resettlement pro­
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gramme. The demand for land and the illegal occupation of land became a 
strategic instrument used by the government when eventually opting for a fast 
track approach. However, the scale of land acquisition, the social forces agitat­
ing for it and the instruments used in the first 20 years of Zimbabwe’s inde­
pendence exhibit a systematic pattern of change. The interactive processes of 
different land acquisition instruments reflected some level of negotiation frame­
work. Peasants and war veterans used land occupations to arm-twist both gov­
ernment and farmers for the land question to be resolved. At the international 
level, government presented such occupations as requiring international part­
ners to pay for the costs of land reform. The high ground negotiating bid of the 
government was the threat of mass compulsory land acquisition which they 
eventually carried out through the fast track programme.
However, since 2000, land transfers have been done on a massive scale 
with no international financial support. This alone is unprecedented in the his­
tory of land reforms internationally. There is now a precise need to understand 
more clearly the strategies that work for land reform based on Zimbabwe’s 
experiences. The experiences of the first agricultural revolution which consoli­
dated large-scale commercial farming and the second agricultural revolution 
which buttressed the smallholder or peasant production provides a potential 
framework for minimizing the negative impact of the land transfers. Zimba­
bwe, with the highest rate of inflation in the world, a negative gross domestic 
product growth, little foreign currency and contracted export markets due to 
sanctions was forced to carry out a fast track land reform programme using 
internal resources. Clearly many people have benefited from the land reform as 
for the first time some have land of good quality. The most significant cost of 
the land acquisition was the failure to find a means of negotiating and combin­
ing the interests of the key stakeholders and the nation at large. As Zimbabwe 
grapples with the multiple and fluid complexities that have emerged from its 
land reform programme, effective policies need to be put in place for people to 
use the land productively.
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